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The British Importation of American 
Corporate Compliance 
INTRODUCTION 
Legislators and prosecutors in Britain are reevaluating 
laws and procedures concerning corporate crime. In an effort to 
modernize and strengthen corporate criminal laws, British 
policymakers are examining and, in some instances, 
“importing” corporate criminal laws and procedures from the 
United States. This exchange of legal theories is rooted in 
comparative law, which allows attorneys, legislators, and 
scholars to understand and learn from legal systems in foreign 
jurisdictions.1 As in this instance, policymakers may be so 
influenced by a foreign legal system that they decide to 
incorporate a version of the foreign system into their domestic 
legal structure.2  
The director of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), the 
British counterpart to the United States Department of Justice 
(DOJ),3 has publicly advocated changing both the substantive 
  
 1 The practice of comparing substantive laws and legal procedures is “at once 
very old and very modern.” Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Company Law 1162 (Max Planck 
Inst. for Private Law & ECGI, Working Paper No. 77/2006, 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=980981. Comparative company law is “old” because “ever since 
companies and company laws first existed, trade has not stopped at the frontiers of 
countries and states.” Id. Academic treatment of comparative law in the corporate 
context, however, is a fairly recent development that was driven by “the spread of 1930s 
American securities regulation into Europe, the company law harmonization efforts of the 
European Community . . . [and] the rise of the corporate governance movement.” Id. at 
1162-63. The corporate governance “international bandwagon” started in the United 
States and the United Kingdom, traveled over to Continental Europe and Japan, and has 
since “permeated practically all industrialized countries.” Id. at 1163. 
 2 See id. at 1167 (“Comparative law has always been considered to be an 
enrichment of the stock of legal solutions . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 3 The SFO has “jurisdiction in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, but 
not in Scotland, the Isle of Man, or the Channel Islands.” Who We Are, SERIOUS FRAUD 
OFFICE, http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/who-we-are.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
For purposes of this note, I use “Great Britain” and “United Kingdom” and variations 
thereof to describe the territories over which the SFO has jurisdiction, recognizing that 
SFO jurisdiction does not correspond directly to the political or geographical territories 
designated by these terms. The United Kingdom, as a sovereign state, is comprised of 
the constituent countries and political entities of England, Scotland, Wales, and 
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corporate criminal laws and the procedural mechanisms in 
Great Britain to better combat corporate crime.4 In order to 
change the substantive law, the director has suggested 
lowering the required mens rea5 for corporate criminal 
liability.6 Although this change has not yet been implemented 
by Parliament, the SFO has made changes to its legal 
procedures by developing and using what I refer to herein as 
“Compliance Agreements” when dealing with corporate 
wrongdoers. These Compliance Agreements bear a strong 
resemblance to American Deferred and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements.7 However, the SFO is using these Compliance 
Agreements in conjunction with civil, rather than criminal, 
laws in an effort to fight corporate crime.8  
Legislators in Britain are examining substantive laws 
and procedures in the United States for a variety of reasons, 
including the success that the United States government—
specifically the United States Attorney’s Office for the 
Southern District of New York (SDNY)9—has had in 
prosecuting corporations for their crimes. Moreover, the United 
Kingdom and the United States both have “strong judiciaries, 
low levels of government corruption, and highly developed 
stock markets,” which facilitate the comparison and exchange 
of laws and legal procedures.10 Both jurisdictions also use the 
same general legal framework for corporate criminal 
culpability, and provide largely similar due process rights to 
  
Northern Ireland. Great Britain, as a territory, refers to England, Scotland, and Wales, 
but excludes Northern Ireland.  
 4 Vivian Robinson, Gen. Counsel, Serious Fraud Office, Speech: International 
Co-operation in the Investigation of Serious Fraud and Corruption (Aug. 13, 2009), 
available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-views/other-speeches/speeches-2009.aspx 
(follow “International Co-operation in the investigation” hyperlink). 
 5 Mens rea is “an element of criminal responsibility; . . . a criminal intent. 
Guilty knowledge and willfulness.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 985 (6th ed. 1990).  
 6 Robinson, supra note 4. 
 7 Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements are essentially contracts 
whereby the government agrees to defer or to cease prosecuting a corporation that has 
engaged in some unlawful conduct in return for the corporation’s admission of 
wrongdoing and pledge to institute remedial reforms. See infra Part III.  
 8 Id.  
 9 The SDNY represents the interests of the United States government in a 
variety of matters. It has jurisdiction in New York County and seven other counties. 
The director, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York, reports 
to the United States Attorney General. For an overview of the DOJ and its agencies, 
see Department of Justice Agencies, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www. 
justice.gov/agencies/index-org.html.  
 10 John Armour et al., Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An Empirical 
Comparison of the United Kingdom and the United States, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
687, 689 (2009) (footnotes omitted). 
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defendants.11 Further, the prosecuting offices frequently work 
together or in parallel investigations to resolve 
multijurisdictional cases, especially those concerning foreign 
bribery and corruption.12  
While British policymakers have looked to the United 
States for guidance in combating corporate crime, this note 
argues that American policymakers should similarly learn from 
the developments in Britain. The SFO is currently adopting a 
procedure that has been widely criticized since its inception in 
the United States.13 The SFO should familiarize itself with the 
criticisms of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements, as 
they predict many of the likely problems that the SFO will face 
in adding Compliance Agreements to its procedural toolkit. The 
SFO should also anticipate unique problems that might arise 
from incorporating into a civil system a procedure that was 
designed for use in the criminal context. 
Despite importing such a controversial procedure, the 
SFO has been successful in at least two instances in achieving 
corporate reform through the use of Compliance Agreements. 
These successes emphasize the drawbacks of the American 
corporate criminal system as a whole and demonstrate that 
civil laws and procedures may, in fact, achieve corporate reform 
without fostering adversarial relationships between the 
government and corporate entities. American policymakers 
  
 11 JESSICA DE GRAZIA, REVIEW OF THE SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE 2 (2008), 
available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/34318/de%20grazia%20review%20of%20sfo.pdf. 
 12 See Richard Alderman, Dir., Serious Fraud Office, Speech: The SFO and 
DOJ ‘Special Relationship’: The Future of UK/US Co-operation against Overseas 
Corruption and Other Crimes (Dec. 9, 2009), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-
us/our-views/speeches/speeches-2009.aspx (follow “The SFO and DOJ ‘Special 
Relationship’” hyperlink) (discussing the interaction between the SFO and the DOJ in 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) cases, relating the SFO’s progress concerning 
“global settlements,” and discussing extradition policies of the United States and 
United Kingdom). One recent example of a parallel investigation by the SFO and the 
SDNY is the Allied Deals cases. DE GRAZIA, supra note 11, at 37. The conspiracies 
charged in these cases involved two brothers, one in New York City and the other in 
London, who operated a Ponzi scheme by which bank loans were laundered through 
Allied Deals, Inc., and an international network of companies that were purportedly 
engaged in metal trading. United States v. Chu, 183 F. App’x 94, 96 (2d Cir. 2006). See 
infra Part III for a full discussion of the foreign bribery statutes in the United Kingdom 
and the United States; see also infra notes 39-55 and accompanying text (discussing 
the parallel investigation and global settlement in R v. Innospec Ltd., [2010] EW Misc. 
(EWCC) 7 (Eng.)).  
 13 The Accountability in Deferred Prosecution Act of 2009, H.R. 1947, 111th 
Cong. § 4 (2009), which was introduced in Congress for consideration by the House 
Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law, 
illustrates many of the criticisms of the use of Deferred and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements. 
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should examine the developments in Great Britain and 
consider making changes to corporate criminal laws and 
procedures in light of the SFO’s achievements. 
Part I of this note examines the development of 
corporate criminal laws in the United States and Britain. Part 
II describes how policymakers at the SFO have suggested 
changes in substantive British laws to mimic corporate 
criminal laws in the United States. Part III compares corporate 
reform under Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements to 
corporate reform under British Compliance Agreements. Part 
IV describes the likely problems the SFO faces by importing a 
procedure that was designed for use in criminal prosecutions. 
Finally, Part V describes some of the successes of British 
Compliance Agreements, and uses the developments in the 
United Kingdom as a basis to suggest changes in corporate 
criminal procedures and substantive laws in the United States.  
I. THE HISTORY AND COMPARISON OF SUBSTANTIVE 
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
GREAT BRITAIN 
Until the early 1900s, American corporate criminal law14 
closely followed English common law doctrine, which did not 
provide a basis for imputing liability to a corporation based on 
the actions of employees. However, an American case in the 
early 1900s established a distinctive theory of corporate 
criminal liability. While English law has since evolved, the two 
legal systems retain differences in the scope of liability for 
corporate entities. However, in the last several years, 
Parliament has passed new legislation broadening the scope of 
liability for corporations in some specific instances, thereby 
mimicking the theory of liability in the United States and 
reversing the flow of influence.  
It is well established that, in the United States today, 
an organization15 may be held vicariously liable for the crimes 
that its employees commit within the scope of their 
employment. Until 1909, American courts declined to hold 
  
 14 This note focuses on federal laws and federal crimes. State laws may differ.  
 15 An “organization” is “a person other than an individual.” 18 U.S.C. § 18 
n.1. The term includes “corporations, partnerships, associations, joint-stock companies, 
unions, trusts, pension funds, unincorporated organizations, governments and political 
subdivisions thereof, and non-profit organizations.” Id.  
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organizations liable for the acts of individuals.16 Then, in New 
York Central Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States, the 
Supreme Court upheld a statute subjecting a corporate entity 
to criminal liability.17 The Court explained the theory behind 
vicarious liability for corporations for intent-based crimes, 
stating that a “corporation is held responsible for acts not 
within the agent’s corporate powers strictly construed, but 
which the agent has assumed to perform for the corporation 
when employing the corporate powers actually authorized.”18 
The Court imputed liability, citing public policy concerns and 
reasoning that “[s]ince a corporation acts by its officers and 
agents, their purposes, motives, and intent are just as much 
those of the corporation as are the things done.”19 
The New York Central decision “upheld a statute that 
expressly punished corporations. It did not suggest that 
statutes silent on the subject should be read to [impute liability 
to businesses].”20 Rather, the Court noted that “there are some 
crimes, which in their nature cannot be committed by 
corporations.”21 After this decision, however, the Supreme Court 
and other courts in the United States routinely read criminal 
statutes to impose liability on corporations under a theory of 
respondeat superior.22  
Current federal law applies an expansive interpretation 
of this theory, holding that an organization can be convicted of 
nearly any crime committed by an employee, provided that he 
or she was acting within the scope of his or her authority and 
acted “with the intention to help the company, even if the 
  
 16  N.Y. Central Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 493-94 
(1909). 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 492-93 (citations omitted).  
 20 Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of 
Corporations, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1363 (2009). 
 21 N.Y. Central, 212 U.S. at 494.  
 22 Alschuler, supra note 20, at 1363. Respondeat superior is the principle that 
authorizes corporate punishment whenever “an agent or other person acting for or 
employed by the corporation acting within the scope of employment violate[s] a 
statute’s prohibitions.” Id. at 1364. Some states in America, by contrast, have limited 
the standard of liability to cases in which “the commission of the offense was 
authorized, requested, commanded, performed, or recklessly tolerated by the board of 
directors or by a high managerial agent acting on behalf of the corporation within the 
scope of his office or employment.” Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(c) (Proposed 
Official Draft 1962)).  
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employee was violating express directions or corporate 
policies.”23 A corporation can be held criminally liable if: 
the criminal conduct is undertaken without the knowledge of top 
management; the criminal activity was performed by a low-level 
employee; the primary purpose was to benefit only the miscreant 
employee; there was no actual benefit to the corporation; the 
criminal acts were performed in direct violation of instructions from 
the company; . . . no single individual had the requisite intent or 
knowledge sufficient to violate the law; it is never possible to identify 
the actual employee or agent responsible for the crime; or the 
offending employees are all acquitted of the same offense.24 
This exposes corporations to liability for a vast array of federal 
crimes.25 In fact, the scope of the modern rule is so expansive 
that “a single errant employee can cause the downfall of a 
multinational corporation and the loss of thousands of jobs.”26  
Unlike American courts that apply an expansive theory 
of corporate criminal liability, British courts are hesitant to 
impose liability on business organizations for the acts of 
employees. As early as the seventeenth century, English courts 
held that a corporation could not be indicted for wrongful acts, 
or misfeasance,27 because it exists “not as a natural person, but 
  
 23 Robert J. Ridge & Mackenzie A. Baird, The Pendulum Swings Back: 
Revisiting Corporate Criminality and the Rise of Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 
33 U. DAYTON L. REV. 187, 189 (2008). The requirement that employees must be acting 
within the scope of their employment “has been interpreted so expansively that it is 
practically invisible in many contexts.” Andrew Weissmann & David Newman, 
Rethinking Criminal Corporate Liability, 82 IND. L. J. 411, 422 (2007) (adding that the 
scope of employment is the agent’s “actual or apparent authority” (emphasis added)). 
The requirement that the employee intended to help the corporation has also been 
expanded “because courts recognize that many employees act primarily for their own 
personal gain.” Id. (quoting Kendel Drew & Kyle A. Clark, Corporate Criminal 
Liability, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 277, 282 (2005)). An agent does not have to be acting 
with the sole motivation to assist the corporation, and organizations have been held 
liable for acts of agents “no matter what their place in the corporate hierarchy.” Id. at 
423; see also id. at 423 n.37 (“Corporate criminal liability has been predicated on the 
actions of low-level employees, including salespeople, manual laborers, truck drivers, 
and clerical workers.”).  
 24 Ridge & Baird, supra note 23, at 189 (quoting Preet Bharara, Corporations 
Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul: Rethinking Prosecutorial Pressure on 
Corporate Defendants, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 53, 64-65 (2007)).  
 25 “Examples of the unlawful activity of [American] corporations range from 
routine ‘union busting,’ violations of environmental regulations, and price-fixing, to 
illegal foreign payments, smuggling, and fraud of various kinds.” Kent Greenfield, 
Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With Notes on How 
Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1287-
88 (2001) (footnotes omitted). 
 26 Alschuler, supra note 20, at 1364.  
 27 “Misfeasance” is an “improper performance of some act which a person may 
lawfully do.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1000. 
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as an artificial entity.”28 Courts reasoned that a corporate entity 
“lacked physical, mental, and moral capacity to engage in 
wrongful conduct, or to suffer punishment. It could neither 
commit criminal acts, entertain criminal intent, nor suffer 
imprisonment,” and therefore could not be subject to liability.29 
During this time however, a variety of cases demonstrated that 
a corporation could be held “liable on a presentment of 
nonfeasance.”30  
In 1846, in the leading case of The Queen v. Great North 
England Railway,31 the court recognized that a corporation 
could also be liable for misfeasance and “imposed corporate 
criminal liability for the misconduct of employees acting within 
the scope of employment” by “borrowing a theory of vicarious 
liability from tort law.”32 Despite recognizing that liability could 
attach to corporations for the acts of their employees, English 
courts resisted a broad interpretation of the “corporation-as-
person metaphor” and continued to hold corporations liable 
only where statutes provided strict liability, since corporate 
entities could not manifest the required mens rea for crimes 
that had a “moral dimension.”33 
Today, British courts will hold entities liable where an 
offense makes an express provision for corporate liability, as 
the United States Supreme Court reasoned in New York 
Central.34 Where no express statutory provision exists, however, 
British law provides that a corporation will have imputed to it 
the acts and state of mind of “those who represent the 
[company’s] directing mind and will.”35 Whether the court will 
  
 28 Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History 
and an Observation, 60 WASH. U. L. Q. 393, 396 (1982). 
 29 Id.  
 30 Id. at 401 (citing Case of Langforth Bridge, (1635) 79 Eng. Rep. 919 (K.B.)). 
“Nonfeasance” is “the omission of an act which a person ought to do.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY, supra note 5, at 1000. 
 31 (1846) 115 Eng. Rep. 1294 (Q.B.). 
 32 Brickey, supra note 28, at 402-03 (footnotes omitted). 
 33 Weissmann & Newman, supra note 23, at 419. 
 34 SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, GUIDANCE ON CORPORATE PROSECUTIONS 2-4, 
available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/65228/com1%20joint%20guidance%20on%20 
corporate%20prosecutions%20for%20publication.pdf (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). 
 35 Id. at 4 (citing Lennards Carrying Co. & Asiatic Petroleum, [1915] A.C. 705 
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.); R v. Andrews Weatherfoil, [1972] 56 Crim. App. 31 
(A.C.) (Eng.); Bolton Eng’g Co. v. Graham, [1957] 1 Q.B. 159 (Eng.)). “Directing mind 
and will” is restricted to “the Board of Directors, the Managing Director, and perhaps 
other superior officers who carry out functions of management and speak and act as 
the company.” Id. (quoting Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass, [1972] A.C. 153 (H.L.) 
(appeal taken from Eng.)).  
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attribute acts of a natural person to the entity will be 
determined by evaluating the constitution of the company 
concerned (including articles of association, minutes of the 
general meetings, and various memoranda) and definitions in 
the applicable statute.36  
Although British law provides for vicarious liability, it 
rarely arises in trial because proving a corporation’s state of 
mind such that liability could be imputed is “notoriously 
difficult.”37 Because British law requires the prosecution to 
“identify an individual as the directing mind and will of the 
company in respect of the relevant activity” in order to 
attribute that individual’s state of mind to the company,38 
prosecution of corporations in Britain today occurs with much 
less frequency than in the United States. 
Prosecutions of corporations, however, do occur in 
Britain. A recent example is the case of R v. Innospec Ltd., 
where a British company and wholly owned subsidiary of a 
Delaware corporation, Innospec Inc., pleaded guilty to 
conspiracy to corrupt pursuant to section 1 of the Criminal Law 
Act 1997.39 The DOJ, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), and Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) began 
investigating the parent company, Innospec Inc., in July 2005, 
and in October 2007 notified the SFO, which began its own 
investigation in May 2008.40 The American investigation 
revealed that between 2001 and 2004, Innospec Inc. entered 
into five contracts under the United Nations’ Oil for Food 
Program with the Iraq Ministry of Oil to sell tetraethyl lead,41 
  
 36 Id. In this way, British law resembles the United States Model Penal Code 
and the laws of some individual states which have limited the principle of respondeat 
superior to offenses that were authorized or tolerated by a corporation’s board of 
directors or by high managerial staff acting on behalf of the corporation or within the 
scope of employment. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. 
 37 Jonathan Cotton, United Kingdom: A New, More American World?, INT’L FIN. 
L. REV., THE 2009 GUIDE TO LITIGATION, Apr. 1, 2009 (internal quotation marks omitted), 
available at http://www.iflr.com/Article/2176832/Channel/193438/United-Kingdom-A-new-
more-American-world.html. Thus even today “criminal corporate liability would not 
normally extend to crimes such as rape and murder” because they involve a moral 
dimension, and it would be unlikely that the court could find that the “directing mind 
and will” of the corporation “acted in the scope of employment and at least in part to 
benefit the company” such that vicarious liability could attach. Weissmann & Newman, 
supra note 23, at 419 n.17.  
 38  Cotton, supra note 37.  
 39  R v. Innospec Ltd., [2010] EW Misc. (EWCC) 7, [1] (Eng.). 
 40  Id. at [6]. 
 41  Tetraethyl lead, or TEL, is an antiknock fuel additive, which has been 
phased out of use by regulators since the 1970s because of health and environmental 
concerns. Id. at [4].  
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agreeing to pay the Ministry ten percent of the contract price 
as a bribe.42  
Investigators also discovered that in addition to the 
bribes of the Iraq Ministry of Oil, Innospec Ltd., the British 
subsidiary, bribed Indonesian officials to secure contracts from 
the Indonesian government for the supply of tetraethyl lead.43 
The Crown Court ultimately found that directors of Innospec 
Ltd., whose executive offices were in Britain, had conspired 
with the company and others to make payments of 
approximately $8 million to senior government officials in 
Indonesia in violation of section 1 of the Prevention of 
Corruption Act 1906.44 In September 2008, independent 
directors of Innospec Inc. admitted to the criminal offenses and 
began discussions with American prosecutors to reach a “global 
settlement.”45 
In late 2009, the company agreed to plead guilty both to 
offenses in the United States and the United Kingdom, subject 
to court approval in both jurisdictions.46 Prosecutors at the SFO 
and DOJ began discussions about the terms of the settlement 
and how the penalty should be divided, finally deciding in 
January 2010 that the SFO, DOJ, and the SEC and OFAC 
together, would each receive a proportion of the settlement, 
resulting in $14.1 million to the DOJ, $11.2 million to the SEC, 
$2.2 million to OFAC, and $12.7 million to the SFO.47 Although 
the fines and other penalties could have exceeded $400 million 
in the United States and $150 million in the United Kingdom, 
this would have put the company out of business. Thus 
prosecutors agreed, in light of the company’s full admission and 
cooperation, to limit the penalty.48 Innospec Ltd. also agreed to 
establish a compliance and ethics program and to submit to 
corporate monitoring for a period not less than three years, 
with the monitor to be chosen in agreement with the SFO.49  
  
 42  Id. at [6]. After the United Nations Oil for Food Program was discontinued, 
Innospec Inc. continued to make bribes resulting in a total of $5.8 million paid or 
promised. Id. 
 43  Id. at [4].  
 44  Id. at [1], [4]-[5]. 
 45  Id. at [7]. 
 46  Id. at [8]. 
 47  Id. at [13]. The SFO sought to recover $6.7 million of this amount in a 
criminal penalty for the Indonesian corruption and $6 million in a civil recovery for the 
Iraq corruption. Id. at [17(v)]. 
 48  Id. at [7]. 
 49  Id. at [18]. 
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Although the British court eventually approved the 
global settlement, it held that prosecutors lack the authority to 
set the penalty amount of such agreements.50 The court held 
that in criminal cases involving a plea agreement between the 
defendant (whether natural or artificial) and the government, a 
prosecutor may assist the court in determining the appropriate 
penalty.51 However, the court held that “principles of 
transparent and open justice require a court sitting in public 
itself first to determine by a hearing . . . the extent of the 
criminal conduct on which the offender has entered the plea, 
and then, on the basis of its determination as to the conduct, 
the appropriate sentence.”52 This holding effectively limits the 
ability of British prosecutors to negotiate and agree upon a 
settlement amount with either the defendant corporation or 
with foreign authorities.53  
The court approved the power of prosecutors to issue a 
Civil Recovery Order (CRO) for property obtained through the 
unlawful conduct of a corporation.54 The court noted, however, 
that it would “rarely be appropriate for criminal conduct by a 
company to be dealt with by means of a [CRO].”55 Rather, a civil 
penalty may provide a means of compensation in addition to a 
fine in the case of corporate criminality. As a result, British 
  
 50  Id. at [26]. 
 51  Id. at [27]. 
 52  Id. 
 53 The court noted that while “there may be discussion and agreement as to 
the basis of plea, a court must rigorously scrutinize in open court in the interests of 
transparency and good governance the basis of that plea and to see whether it reflects 
the public interest.” Id. 
 54  Id. at [37]; see infra Part III.B (discussing CROs). The SFO sought 
approximately half of its share of the $12.7 million settlement in a civil recovery for the 
conduct in Iraq. Innospec, [2010] EW Misc. (EWCC) at [13]. The SFO sought a civil 
recovery, rather than a criminal penalty, in part because the SFO was concerned that 
imposing a criminal penalty for the same conduct charged in the United States would 
subject the corporation to double jeopardy. Id. at [37]. The British court disagreed, and 
further stated that that in light of the unavailability of funds, the criminal penalty for 
the conduct in Indonesia should not have been reduced by requiring a civil recovery for 
the conduct in Iraq. Id. at [38]. Rather, the court noted that states should “adopt a 
uniform approach to financial penalties for corruption of foreign government officials so 
that the penalties in each country do not discriminate either favourably or 
unfavourably against a company in a particular state.” Id. at [31]. The court reasoned 
that “[i]f the penalties in one state are lower than in another, businesses in the state 
with lower penalties will not be deterred so effectively from engaging in corruption in 
foreign states, whilst businesses in states where the penalties are higher may complain 
that they are disadvantaged in foreign states.” Id.  
 55  Id. at [38]. The court stated that “[i]t would be inconsistent with basic 
principles of justice for the criminality of corporations to be glossed over by a civil as 
opposed to a criminal sanction.” Id.  
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prosecutors may be required to seek a criminal penalty, rather 
than a civil recovery, where the “directing mind and will” of the 
corporation has committed some unlawful conduct such that 
liability could be imputed to the corporation. Nevertheless, R v. 
Innospec Ltd. demonstrates that while prosecutions of 
corporations in Britain occur with less frequency than in the 
United States, they do happen and have serious consequences. 
II. CHANGES TO SUBSTANTIVE LAWS AND PROCEDURES IN 
BRITAIN 
The SFO and Parliament have been considering and 
implementing changes to the substantive laws and procedural 
mechanisms in Britain to strengthen the government’s ability 
to combat corporate crime and to institute corporate reforms. 
These developments widen the scope of corporate criminal 
liability and alter the interaction between the SFO and 
business organizations operating in Britain.  
A. Changes to Substantive Corporate Criminal Laws 
While legislators in Britain have not yet changed the 
general standard for imputing criminal liability to 
corporations, Parliament has recently passed several statutes 
that include specific offenses for corporate entities, thereby 
broadening corporate criminal liability in certain instances.  
In 2007, Parliament passed the Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, which created a 
new homicide offense in which an organization will be found 
guilty “if the way in which its activities are managed or 
organised—(a) cause the person’s death, and (b) amounts to a 
gross breach of a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation 
to the deceased.”56 The Act does not require that the 
corporation’s “directing mind and will” be responsible.57 In early 
2010, Parliament also passed the Bribery Act, which created 
new offenses for bribing a foreign public official and for the 
  
 56 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, 2007, c.19, § 1(1) (U.K.). 
 57 However, a corporation will only be found guilty if the “way in which its 
activities are managed or organised by its senior management is a substantial 
element” of the breach of the duty of care. Id. § 1(3). “Senior level” means individuals 
“who make significant decisions about the organisation or substantial parts of it.” 
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, UNDERSTANDING THE CORPORATE MANSLAUGHTER AND 
CORPORATE HOMICIDE ACT 2007, at 1 (2007), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/ 
guidance/docs/manslaughterhomicideact07.pdf. 
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failure of a corporation to prevent a bribe from being made on 
its behalf.58 These changes to the laws considerably broaden the 
scope of liability for corporate entities and demonstrate a shift 
toward the American framework.  
Further, the United Kingdom Law Commission, a body 
appointed by the Lord Chancellor to examine and reform the 
laws, is evaluating the existing corporate criminal laws as a 
part of its project on the codification of substantive criminal 
law.59 This suggests that further changes to the British system 
should be anticipated.  
B. Developments at the Serious Fraud Office and Changes 
to Legal Procedures 
While Parliament considers reforming the substantive 
laws, the SFO is undergoing structural changes and making 
significant amendments to its procedures for dealing with 
corporate wrongdoers.60 The SFO was established in 1988 by 
the Criminal Justice Act 1987.61 The SFO is an independent 
government department that investigates and prosecutes, as a 
part of the British criminal justice system, overseas corruption 
cases and “serious and complex fraud” cases exceeding a value 
  
 58 Bribery Act, 2010, c.23, §§ 1-3 (U.K.).  
 59 Corporate Criminal Liability, LAW COMMISSION (July 2, 2008), http://www. 
lawcom.gov.uk/1150.htm. 
 60  Practical developments have also emerged, including an increase in the 
level of fines or civil penalties and disgorgements that British companies have been 
required to pay as a result of their wrongdoing. These increases resemble the high fines 
levied against corporations in the United States. Cotton, supra note 37. Further, 
individuals in the United Kingdom who have been involved in corporate crime are 
being subjected to longer prison sentences, and the SFO has imposed greater asset 
confiscation orders on these individuals, which are more reflective of the penalties 
imposed on individuals in the United States. Id. “British law enforcement agents have 
said they [also] want to develop their use of the American ‘campaign based 
approach’ . . . in which investigators identify an industry they think is highly corrupt 
and then try to bring simultaneous prosecution against a large number of people in it.” 
Stephanie Kirchgaessner & Michael Peel, FBI Sting Nets 22 Executives in Bribery 
Probe, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2010, 11:00 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/516f276c-054d-
11df-a85e-00144feabdc0.html (follow “Register For Free” hyperlink; then follow “Sign 
Up” hyperlink under “Registered” column for free access). 
 61 History & Legislation, SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, http://www.sfo.gov.uk/ 
about-us/history--legislation.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). During the 1970s and 
early 1980s, the British public was unhappy with officials for failing to investigate and 
prosecute serious and complex fraud. The government then established the Fraud 
Trials Committee, which recommended that a new organization be responsible for 
investigating and prosecuting these types of fraud. The Committee’s report spurred the 
introduction of the Criminal Justice Act 1987 and, thereby, the SFO. Id. 
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of £1 million.62 Like the DOJ, through the individual United 
States Attorney’s Offices (like the SDNY), the SFO handles 
both the investigation and prosecution of various cases.63  
In 2006, the SFO, then under the direction of the 
British Attorney General Lord Peter Goldsmith and SFO 
Director Robert Wardle, was widely criticized for its decision to 
halt investigation of BAE Systems for bribery after Saudi 
Arabia threatened to cease purchasing aircrafts and sharing 
anti-terrorism intelligence with Britain.64 In March 2007, Lord 
Goldsmith decided that the agency “needed a thorough 
makeover.”65 He invited Jessica de Grazia, a thirteen-year 
  
 62 Who We Are, supra note 3; see also Does the Fraud Fit SFO Criteria?, 
SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-policies-and-publications/ 
does-the-fraud-fit-sfo-criteria.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). The SFO investigates a 
variety of frauds including investment fraud, bribery, corruption, corporate fraud, and 
public sector fraud. See Kirchgaessner & Peel, supra note 60. “Fraud is a type of criminal 
activity, defined as ‘intentional deception to obtain an advantage, avoid an obligation, or 
cause loss to another person or company.’” Fraud, SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, 
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/fraud.aspx (last visited Nov. 1, 2010); see also Fraud Act, 2006, 
c.35, §§ 1-4 (U.K.) (defining fraud as false representation, failure to disclose information, 
and abuse of position to require intent to realize personal gain or gain for another, to 
cause loss to another, or to expose another to risk of loss). Factors that will be examined 
in accepting a case of suspected fraud are whether there is “a significant international 
dimension;” whether “the case [is] likely to be of widespread concern;” whether “the case 
require[s] highly specialised knowledge, e.g. of financial markets;” and whether “there [is] 
a need to use the SFO’s special powers, such as section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act.” 
Richard Alderman, Dir., Serious Fraud Office, Speech: An Update from the Serious Fraud 
Office: The Way Forward (Feb. 26, 2009), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-
views/speeches/speeches-2009.aspx (follow “An Update from the Serious Fraud Office: 
The Way Forward” hyperlink). Section 2 of the Criminal Justice Act refers to the 
investigatory powers of the SFO where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a 
serious and/or complex fraud or corruption has been committed. Criminal Justice Act, 
1987, c.38, § 2, sch. 1 (U.K.). 
 63 DE GRAZIA, supra note 11, at 2. The DOJ and the United States Attorney’s 
Offices are over two centuries old, however, while the SFO is only twenty years old and 
still evolving. Id.  
 64 A Bit of an Old Boy’s Club, FCPA BLOG (Feb. 2, 2009, 7:22 PM), http:// 
www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/2/3/a-bit-of-an-old-boys-club.html. The SFO was investigating 
the affairs of BAE Systems with regard to the Al Yamamah defense contract with the 
government of Saudi Arabia, and ceased the investigation citing “the need to safeguard 
national and international security.” Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, BAE 
Systems Plc/Saudi Arabia (Dec. 14, 2006), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-
room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2006/bae-systems-plcsaudi-arabia.aspx. The 
investigation centered on allegations that the company had bribed Saudi Arabian 
government officials in exchange for the sale of Typhoon jet fighters. SFO to Request 
Prosecution of BAE, FCPA BLOG (Sept. 30, 2009, 8:13 PM), http://www.fcpablog. 
com/blog/2009/10/1/sfo-to-request-prosecution-of-bae.html. On September 30, 2009, the 
SFO announced that it intended “to seek the Attorney General’s consent to prosecute 
BAE Systems for offenses relating to overseas corruption,” but the sales to Saudi 
Arabia were not part of the request for the prosecution. Id.  
 65 David Leppard, She Came, She Saw, She Scythed Through the SFO, TIMES 
ONLINE (U.K.) (Feb. 1, 2009), http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/economics/ 
article5627453.ece. 
316 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1 
Assistant District Attorney in Manhattan to evaluate the 
agency with “unrestricted remit.”66 Her commentary 
“amount[ed] to one of the most damning official indictments of 
a government agency ever penned.”67 In her 157-page final 
report, de Grazia emphasized that the “SFO uses significantly 
more resources per case” than the SDNY and the District 
Attorney’s Office of New York (DANY) and “achieves 
significantly less for its efforts, as measured by both its 
productivity (the number of defendants prosecuted) and its 
conviction rate.”68 She traced these facts to both external 
factors, including “laws, government policy, and legal 
professional rules and practices,” and internal factors of “the 
SFO’s own policies and practices,” including skills shortages, 
inadequate management and leadership, lack of clarity about 
roles and responsibilities, insufficient early case screening, 
unfocused investigations, risk-averse culture, and ineffective 
use of powers.69 
As a result of the report, in April 2008, several top 
officials at the SFO were fired, along with Director Wardle, 
who was replaced by Richard Alderman, a senior lawyer at HM 
Revenue & Customs.70 Under Alderman, the SFO began a 
  
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 DE GRAZIA, supra note 11, at 3. For example, in a prosecution of criminal 
conspiracy in the Allied Deals case  
where the acts on both sides of the Atlantic were the same, SDNY used a total 
team of eight to convict 14 defendants in a third of the time that it took for an 
SFO team totaling 31 to prosecute four defendants, three of whom were convicted 
after an eight-month trial. 
Id. With regard to productivity and conviction rate, 
[i]n 2007, the SFO employed 56 staff attorneys and spent an additional 
£4,227,000 on external counsel. . . . During the five-year period FY 2003-2007, the 
SFO prosecuted to conclusion a total of 166 defendants. In contrast the DANY 
Frauds Bureau . . . which is staffed by only 19 lawyers (slightly less than a third 
of the SFO’s permanent legal staff) and [which] does not contract out any aspect 
of its work to the external bar, concluded the prosecution of 124 defendants in the 
same period. 
Id.; see also infra notes 131-32 and accompanying text (discussing contract staff). 
Further, “during the five-year period of 2003-2007, the SFO’s average conviction rate 
was only 61% of defendants whose cases were concluded during this period. During the 
same period, DANY’s Frauds Bureau had a 92% conviction rate.” DE GRAZIA, supra 
note 11, at 3. 
 69 DE GRAZIA, supra note 11, at 6-13. 
 70 Leppard, supra note 65. The Financial Services Authority (FSA), an 
independent body that regulates the financial services industry, has also been 
reviewing its procedures and appointed a new Chief Criminal Counsel in March 2009. 
Cotton, supra note 37.  
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“fundamental rethink about its role, its culture and how it 
operates.”71 At a speech only two months into his tenure, 
Alderman indicated that he believed the SFO needed to have a 
bigger presence in the City72 and that it should develop its role 
in order to “provide the framework that is needed for a leading 
financial centre.”73 He noted that, under his predecessor, 
“everything [was] geared to investigating complex cases and 
getting them to court for often lengthy trials.”74 Alderman, 
however, believed that prosecution would not always be 
appropriate and began to look for alternatives.75  
Alderman became interested in incorporating some of 
the procedural tools that the DOJ had at its disposal, 
specifically Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements.76 In the 
view of SFO General Counsel Vivian Robinson, these 
agreements are an “efficient and cost-effective way of disposing 
of appropriate cases as an alternative to often drawn-out 
prosecution through the courts . . . [and] have considerable 
deterrent effect.”77 Further, she believed that these agreements 
produce corporate reform by incentivizing corporations to self-
police and report wrongdoing to the government.78 
While the SFO does not yet have the ability to enter into 
Deferred or Non-Prosecution Agreements with corporations 
that have acted unlawfully, the SFO has begun to incorporate 
some of the central features of these agreements into 
Compliance Agreements,79 which are used in conjunction with 
civil statutes to achieve corporate reform. These changes, both 
in procedure and in substance, alter the relationship between 
the SFO and corporate entities, and strengthen the ability of 
the SFO to reform the behavior of corporate wrongdoers.  
  
 71 Richard Alderman, Dir., Serious Fraud Office, Speech: Rotary Club of the 
City & Shoreditch (July 17, 2008), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-
views/speeches/speeches-2008.aspx (follow “Rotary Club of the City & Shoreditch” 
hyperlink).  
 72 The “City” refers to the “Square Mile” of the financial and commercial 
heart of Britain in London. It is used colloquially the same way as “Wall Street” is used 
in the United States to indicate a concentration of capital, legal, and regulatory 
systems of the financial market. Like the colloquial “Wall Street,” the “City” refers to 
both a physical place where many financial buildings are located as well as the greater 
theoretical place of financial markets. 
 73 Alderman, supra note 71.  
 74 Id.  
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Robinson, supra note 4. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See infra Part III.B. 
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III. COMPARISON OF BRITISH COMPLIANCE AGREEMENTS AND 
AMERICAN DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION 
AGREEMENTS 
In the United States, with Deferred and Non-
Prosecution Agreements, reformation of a corporate wrongdoer 
is largely a process that occurs within the criminal law context. 
With the British adoption of Compliance Agreements, 
reformation of a corporate wrongdoer may occur within the 
civil law arena. Despite this fundamental difference, the SFO 
has created a procedure that achieves many of the aims of the 
DOJ, including providing incentives for corporations to self-
police ex ante and, once a corporation is found to have engaged 
in some unlawful conduct, to institute reforms and pay 
restitution ex post.  
A. Reforming Corporate Behavior Through Deferred and 
Non-Prosecution Agreements 
The most widely used procedure in American corporate 
criminal cases today is Deferred and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements. Although these agreements have existed since the 
early 1980s, they were rarely used in the corporate criminal 
context until 2003,80 when the Holder Memorandum,81 and 
subsequently the Thompson Memorandum,82 provided for their 
  
 80 Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal 
Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 315-17 (2007). The first case in which a procedure 
resembling a Deferred Prosecution Agreement was used was a government 
investigation into Salomon Brothers for securities fraud violations. Peter Spivak & 
Suijit Raman, Regulating the ‘New Regulators’: Current Trends in Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 159, 163-64 (2008). The first actual Deferred 
Prosecution Agreement involving a major company occurred in 1994, when the SDNY 
“agreed to defer prosecution of Prudential Securities for securities fraud for three 
years, in return for substantial internal reforms.” Id. at 164.  
 81 The Holder Memorandum was issued in 1999, by then-Deputy Attorney 
General Eric Holder, and set forth guidelines for indicting corporations as a response to 
“a group of private practitioners complaining that there was no uniformity in the way 
in which prosecutors decided to indict corporations.” Peter Lattman, The Holder Memo 
and Its Progeny, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Dec. 13, 2006, 8:47 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/ 
law/2006/12/13/the-holder-memo. 
 82 The Thompson Memorandum was issued in 2003, by then-Deputy Attorney 
General Larry Thompson. See Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Att’y 
Gen., on Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. to the Heads of Dep’t Components 
& U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/corporate 
_guidelines.htm. The McNulty Memorandum was issued in 2006 and made two major 
changes to the Thompson Memorandum in light of United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 
2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006): the DOJ (1) could no longer consider as a negative factor a 
company’s refusal to waive attorney-client privilege and (2) could no longer cut off the 
payment of legal fees for employees who were being investigated by the government. 
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use as an alternative to indicting a corporation and proceeding 
with trial.  
Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements are 
essentially contracts offered by the prosecutor to a corporation 
after an alleged wrongdoing within the organization has 
occurred. Such agreements are signed and filed at the charging 
stage, at which point a criminal Complaint or Information is 
filed with the court.83 Typically, these agreements require that 
the company (1) pledge to admit wrongdoing, (2) waive the 
statute of limitations, (3) consent to the agreement being 
admissible in court, (4) agree to cease violating the law, (5) 
assist the government in prosecuting individuals associated 
with the crimes, (6) pledge that employees will not violate the 
terms of the agreement, and (7) pay restitution and fines.84 In 
exchange, the prosecutor guarantees that he or she will 
postpone or drop prosecution.85 Deferred and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements can be, in essence, a form of probation for the 
corporation, typically lasting between approximately one and 
three years.86 
Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements make it 
possible for the government to extract promises from corporate 
entities to improve their structure and behavior, without 
having to prove any misconduct beyond a reasonable doubt in a 
court of law. Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements 
incentivize corporations to self-police ex ante by establishing 
  
See Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Att’y Gen., on Principles of Fed. 
Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. to the Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Attorneys (Dec. 12, 
2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf. In United 
States v. Stein, KPMG came under investigation for illegal tax shelters. The Thompson 
Memorandum provided that advancing attorney’s fees to employees of a target 
corporation might viewed by the government as “protection” of individual actors, and 
prosecutors were instructed that they could take this into account in deciding whether 
to indict the corporation. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 337-38. Although KPMG had a 
policy of paying the attorney’s fees of its employees, KPMG decided in light of its 
conversations with the government to withhold attorney’s fees if the employee refused 
to cooperate with the government. Id. at 345-46. The court held that the government, 
by pressuring KPMG to cut off the legal fees of individual employees in order to meet 
the terms of the Deferred Prosecution Agreement, violated the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendment rights of the individual defendants. Id. at 345. The Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld the decision to dismiss the charges against the individual employees 
because no remedy could cure the government’s constitutional violations. United States 
v. Stein, 541 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 83 Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 
888-89 (2007).  
 84 Lawrence D. Finder et al., Betting the Corporation: Compliance or 
Defiance?, 28 CORP. COUNS. REV. 1, 4 (2009). 
 85  Id. 
 86 See Griffin, supra note 80, at 321.  
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“voluntary” corporate compliance programs to avoid 
prosecution altogether, or to avoid more punitive sentences if 
they are nevertheless found to have participated in some 
wrongful conduct.87 The agreements have this effect in part 
because the prosecutor is instructed to evaluate whether the 
corporation has adopted and implemented a “truly effective” 
compliance program in deciding whether or not to enter into 
the Deferred or Non-Prosecution Agreement after a finding of 
corporate misconduct.88 If the corporation has done so, the 
prosecutor may decide to charge only the corporation’s 
employees and agents, or to mitigate charges or sanctions 
against the corporation.89 As a result of Deferred and Non-
Prosecution Agreements and changes to corporate law brought 
by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,90 a vast majority of 
corporations in the United States have established “voluntary” 
compliance programs largely out of the fear of the threat of 
prosecution.91 
Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements also give the 
federal government a greater ability to pursue individual 
wrongdoers.92 In deciding whether to enter into a Deferred or 
Non-Prosecution Agreement with a corporation, prosecutors 
are instructed to consider the adequacy of prosecuting the 
individuals responsible for the corporation’s wrongdoing.93 The 
prosecutor is further instructed to evaluate the corporation’s 
willingness to replace responsible management or to discipline 
or terminate the responsible employees.94 In order to pursue 
individual wrongdoers, prosecutors often require corporations 
to conduct an internal investigation, which includes disclosing 
information about individual actors in order to receive 
  
 87 Miriam Hechler Baer, Corporate Policing and Corporate Governance: What 
Can We Learn from Hewlett-Packard’s Pretexting Scandal?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 523, 526 
(2008) (footnotes omitted).  
 88 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-28.800 (as amended 
in 2008) [hereinafter USAM]. The programs must also be “designed, implemented, 
reviewed, and revised, as appropriate . . . .” Finder et al., supra note 84, at 23.  
 89 USAM, supra note 88, § 9-28.800.  
 90 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in 
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  
 91 See Finder et al., supra note 84, at 14 n.42. As of January 22, 2009 “over 
89% of publicly traded companies [in the United States] have a compliance program, 
8% have only an ethics program, and 5% have neither an ethics program nor 
compliance program . . . .” Id. Further, “69% of private companies have a compliance 
program, 12% have only an ethics program, and 29% have neither . . . .” Id.  
 92 See Alschuler, supra note 20. 
 93 USAM, supra note 88, § 9-28.300. 
 94 Id. 
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mitigating credit for cooperating with the government.95 This 
requirement gives prosecutors unparalleled access to 
information about the alleged crimes and actors, thereby 
allowing the government to bring charges that may not have 
otherwise been possible due to insufficient evidence.96 In this 
regard, the corporation becomes a type of “investigative 
partner” to the government.97 
With the use of Deferred and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements, federal prosecutors also seek to institute reforms 
of corporate wrongdoers to ensure that the unlawful activity 
does not continue or recur. These agreements assist 
prosecutors in achieving this goal by requiring the corporation 
to hire a monitor, typically charged with retraining employees, 
suggesting changes to the pre-existing compliance program, 
restructuring whole sectors, and removing executives.98 These 
monitors are notoriously expensive.99 
The threat of criminal prosecution also gives 
prosecutors the power to demand that a target corporation pay 
significant fines when it executes a Deferred or Non-
Prosecution Agreement. The payments may be styled as 
damages, punitive fines, compensation to settle civil lawsuits, 
disgorgements, or back-taxes.100 These fines have ranged from 
thousands of dollars to hundreds of millions of dollars and are 
often vastly disproportionate to the monetary value of the 
wrongdoing.101 
Because of the increased ability of prosecutors to reform 
business organizations through Deferred and Non-Prosecution 
  
 95 An internal investigation requires a corporation to disclose the “relevant 
facts” concerning misconduct of the corporation and of individuals. Memorandum from 
Mark R. Filip, Deputy Att’y Gen., on Principles of Fed. Prosecution of Bus. Orgs. to 
Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. Attorneys 9-11, 15-16 (Aug. 28, 2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/corp-charging-guidelines.pdf.  
 96 See Erik Paulsen, Imposing Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion in Corporate 
Prosecution Agreements, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1434, 1458 (2007).  
 97 E.g., United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (where 
the government required the corporation to conduct an extensive internal investigation 
in order to satisfy the terms of a Deferred Prosecution Agreement); see also supra note 
82 (discussing Stein).  
 98 Kathleen M. Boozang & Simone Handler-Hutchinson, “Monitoring” 
Corporate Corruption: DOJ’s Use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 35 AM. J. L. & 
MED. 89, 100-01 (2009). 
 99 Id.  
 100 Garrett, supra note 83, at 900. 
 101 Id. From January 2003 to January 2007, the DOJ entered into thirty-five 
agreements producing a total of $4.95 billion in restitution and averaging $141 million 
per agreement. Id. 
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Agreements, these agreements have become the “sanction of 
choice” in cases of corporate misconduct.102 From 1993 to 2008, 
the United States government entered into a total of 112 
agreements with various corporations.103 During this time, the 
government refrained from filing any criminal charges against 
a major corporation without also entering into a Deferred or 
Non-Prosecution Agreement.104  
These agreements are most frequently used in cases 
where entities have violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA),105 which prohibits corporations and employees from 
bribing foreign officials and requires corporate entities to meet 
certain accounting requirements, including maintaining 
accurate accounting records and a system of internal 
accounting controls.106 But Deferred and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements have been used in a variety of instances of 
corporate wrongdoing, most notably in cases of tax evasion, 
securities fraud, and health care fraud. With the widespread 
use of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements, “pretrial 
diversion has become the ‘standard’ means for conducting 
corporate criminal investigations.”107 
B. The British Civil Recovery Order and Corporate 
Compliance Agreements 
In Britain, the intent requirement in many corporate 
crimes is relatively high, and, as a result, successful 
  
 102 Boozang & Hutchinson, supra note 98, at 97. 
 103 Finder et al., supra note 84, at 1. See id. at 3 for a list of the agreements 
from 2006-2008.  
 104 Spivak & Raman, supra note 80, at 167. Milberg Weiss Bershad & 
Schulman and Reliant Energy Services are “arguable exceptions” because Milberg 
refused to enter into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement citing that the waiver of 
attorney-client privilege was “too onerous,” and, in the case of Reliant, although the 
government believed that it was “uncooperative” with the investigation, Reliant finally 
agreed to enter into an agreement in return for the dismissal of the indictment. Id. at 
n.42; see also infra note 159 (discussing the demise of Arthur Andersen after refusing 
to cooperate with authorities). 
 105  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 106 David Hess & Christie L. Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform 
Undertakings: A New Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 307, 313-14 
(2008); see also Marika Marris & Erika Singer, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 43 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 575, 580-81 (2006). The Organization on Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention went into effect in 1999 and all 
countries that ratified the agreement, including the United Kingdom, now have similar 
statutory provisions to the FCPA. The Convention requires that each signatory country 
“criminalize the bribery of foreign officials.” Id. at 594. 
 107 Spivak & Raman, supra note 80, at 159.  
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prosecution by the SFO of corporate wrongdoers is difficult. 
Therefore corporations in Britain do not face a threat of 
criminal prosecution comparable to that faced by corporations 
operating in the United States, and the SFO cannot rely upon 
Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements to regulate 
corporate criminal misconduct. Instead of importing Deferred 
and Non-Prosecution Agreement procedures unchanged, the 
SFO has adopted a form of these agreements—the Compliance 
Agreement—to be used in conjunction with civil statutes. One 
such civil statute is the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, in which 
Parliament gave the SFO the right, through the use of a Civil 
Recovery Order (CRO), to recover from a person, natural or 
artificial, any property “which is or represents property 
obtained through unlawful conduct.”108 The CRO does not 
require the government to prove the culpability of any person, 
but rather requires it to proceed in rem against any proceeds 
traceable to any unlawful conduct and thereby obtain 
restitution for the wrongdoing.109 By using the CRO in 
conjunction with a Compliance Agreement, the SFO is able to 
regulate corporate conduct and institute reforms, thereby 
achieving many of the same goals of prosecutors in the United 
States. This also allows the SFO to conserve resources for cases 
of corporate wrongdoing severe enough to merit prosecution.  
In 2008, the SFO successfully obtained its first CRO 
against a major business organization. Balfour Beatty, an 
engineering and construction corporation, had been engaged in 
a joint venture to build the Bibliotheca Alexandria in Egypt.110 
The corporation monitored its own accounting practices as 
required under section 221 of the Companies Act 1985, which 
sets forth the standards for maintaining accurate business 
records.111 During the project, Balfour Beatty discovered 
  
 108 Proceeds of Crime Act, 2002, c.29, pmbl. (U.K.). 
 109 Id. §§ 243, 304. 
 110 Press Release, Balfour Beatty, Balfour Beatty Reaches Full Settlement of 
Issues Relating to Bibliotheca Alexandria Project (Oct. 6, 2008) [hereinafter Balfour Press 
Release], available at http://www.balfourbeatty.com/bby/media/press/2008/2008-10-06.  
 111 Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, Balfour Beatty plc (Oct. 6, 2008) 
[hereinafter SFO Press Release], available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-
press-releases/press-releases-2008/balfour-beatty-plc.aspx. Section 221 of the Companies 
Act, 1985, c.40 (U.K.), provides that  
[e]very company shall keep accounting records which are sufficient to show and 
explain the company’s transactions and are such as to (a) disclose with reasonable 
accuracy, at any time, the financial position of the company at that time, and (b) 
enable the directors to ensure that any balance sheet and profit and loss account 
prepared under this Part complies with the requirements of this Act. 
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inaccurate accounting records due to “certain payment 
irregularities” at one of its subsidiaries, and reported this 
finding to the SFO.112 As a result, Balfour Beatty agreed to 
forfeit to the government £2.25 million obtained through 
unlawful conduct and to contribute to the costs of 
proceedings.113 The SFO pursued civil recovery rather than 
criminal prosecution, concluding that an indictment could not 
be brought against the corporation or any individual since no 
financial benefit was derived by any individual employee and 
most of the “relevant individuals” were no longer employed at 
Balfour Beatty or its subsidiaries.114 
The SFO combined its civil recovery procedure with a 
Compliance Agreement that largely mirrored a Non-
Prosecution Agreement. Though the Companies Act does not 
require companies to self-police ex ante, Balfour Beatty had 
established a voluntary compliance program as previously 
suggested by the SFO, conducted its own “fully documented 
internal investigation of the irregularities,” and reported its 
findings to the SFO for further investigation.115 Once Balfour 
Beatty came under investigation, it cooperated fully with the 
SFO and “voluntarily” agreed to introduce certain compliance 
systems.116 This involved requiring Balfour Beatty to take 
“comprehensive steps to review and improve its control 
processes,” and to submit to a form of external monitoring for a 
set period of time.117 
The SFO touted the power it wielded in the case of 
Balfour Beatty as a demonstration of its “commit[ment] to 
combating improper corporate behaviour in line with similar 
efforts being made in other jurisdictions.”118 While the SFO did 
not prosecute the company, it publicized its ability to obtain 
civil restitution and to mandate corporate reformation, thereby 
demonstrating its ability to sanction a major corporate 
  
Id. The Companies Act also describes the information that the accounting records must 
contain. Id. 
 112 Balfour Press Release, supra note 110.  
 113 Id. 
 114 SFO Press Release, supra note 111. 
 115 Balfour Press Release, supra note 110.  
 116 SFO Press Release, supra note 111. 
 117 Id. No further details exist as to the remedial measures that Balfour 
Beatty was required to undertake pursuant to the agreement, either with regard to the 
identity or duties of the monitor, or as to the length of time that he or she was to 
remain with the corporation. For a discussion of monitors, see infra Part V.C.  
 118 SFO Press Release, supra note 111. 
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wrongdoer without the use of criminal laws.119 The SFO 
emphasized that Balfour Beatty would be the first of many 
cases that would require a corporate wrongdoer to self-police, 
report to the government, pay restitution, and institute 
reforms, as corporations do under the Deferred and Non-
Prosecution procedure in the United States.  
Despite the success in the case of Balfour Beatty, the 
SFO has imported a controversial American procedure and 
Compliance Agreements will likely be subject to many of the 
same criticisms of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements. 
However, the achievement of corporate reform and restitution 
without the threat of criminal sanctions may suggest ways in 
which Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements can be 
improved.  
IV. PROBLEMS WITH IMPORTING A FORM OF DEFERRED AND 
NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS  
By importing a form of Deferred and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements, the SFO will likely face many of the same 
criticisms as the DOJ since it began to use these agreements, 
including the production of inconsistent agreements that are 
not regulated by statute or subject to judicial review. But the 
SFO may face unique problems, including the failure to prompt 
corporate entities to report wrongdoing and the production of 
uncertainty in the application and use of Compliance 
Agreements. These anticipated shortcomings stem in part from 
the fact the SFO is importing a procedure that was designed for 
use in the criminal context.  
A. Inconsistency Between Agreements and Lack of Oversight 
One of the most significant criticisms of Deferred and 
Non-Prosecution Agreements in the United States is that the 
guidelines for offering and entering into these agreements are 
not regulated by statute. Instead, the DOJ “has published a 
series of memoranda designed to guide its prosecutors in 
developing a more uniform approach to corporate conduct and 
to inform the defense bar and general public about the factors 
that [DOJ] prosecutors may take into consideration when 
making charging decisions.”120 Because the guidelines are not 
  
 119 Id. 
 120 Ridge & Baird, supra note 23, at 191. 
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codified, they may change with every new Attorney General, 
each of whom may put forth his or her own agreement policy.121 
While the guidelines have been recently incorporated into the 
United States Attorney’s Manual (USAM), they are still subject 
to change without approval from any legislative body.122 
Although the Proceeds of Crime Act and the CRO 
procedure in Britain were enacted by Parliament, a 
memorandum promulgated by SFO Director Alderman gave 
prosecutors the power to enter into and set the terms of 
Compliance Agreements. The Approach of the SFO to Dealing 
with Overseas Corruption, known as “the Guide” for 
prosecutors, was published after the investigation of Balfour 
Beatty at the request of corporate executives in the City.123 The 
Guide, which pertains only to overseas corruption cases like 
that of Balfour Beatty, may be changed or replaced without the 
consent of Parliament. 
Compounding this problem is the fact that Compliance 
Agreements, like Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements, 
are not subject to judicial oversight. Although prosecutors must 
appear before a judge in order to obtain a CRO, the judge does 
not retain any discretion over the terms of the Compliance 
Agreement. Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements have 
been widely criticized for this reason in the United States 
because federal prosecutors have the unilateral authority to 
decide whether the corporation has engaged in any unlawful 
activity, and if so, to determine what the terms of the resulting 
agreement will be and whether the corporation or its employees 
have met or breached the terms of the agreement, without any 
judicial review.124  
Another problem with Deferred and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements is that the DOJ does not require public disclosure 
  
 121 For example, Attorney General Paul McNulty promulgated significant 
changes to Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreement procedures in a 2006 
Memorandum. See supra notes 81-82. 
 122 See id.; USAM, supra note 88, ch. 9-28. 
 123 SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE, APPROACH OF THE SERIOUS FRAUD OFFICE TO 
DEALING WITH OVERSEAS CORRUPTION 1 (2009) [hereinafter SFO Guide], available at 
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/media/28313/approach%20of%20the%20sfo%20to%20dealing%20
with%20overseas%20corruption.pdf. 
 124 Federal judges have oversight of plea agreements and charging decisions, 
however. Garrett, supra note 83, at 906. Judges can either accept or reject plea 
agreements, and can “examine voluntariness, factual basis, fairness, abuse of 
discretion, or infringement on the judge’s sentencing power” in their review. Id. 
Although the “[f]ederal courts are more involved in reviewing plea bargains than 
charging decisions, . . . judges still remain highly deferential.” Id.  
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of the terms of the agreements.125 In the United States, some 
agreements have never been made public. The SFO has 
required slightly more disclosure, though not enough. The 
Guide provides that after the corporation has come under 
investigation by the SFO and agreed to forfeit a specified 
amount to the government, the corporation must make a public 
statement.126 While the SFO and the target entity must agree 
on the content of the public statement, the Guide does not 
describe what facts must be disclosed.127 Indeed, very little has 
been disclosed by Balfour Beatty or the SFO in press releases, 
and the actual terms of the agreement are not public.128 
Another major criticism of Deferred and Non-
Prosecution Agreements in the United States is the 
inconsistency between agreements in different cases. 
Inconsistency has resulted, in part, because “ninety-four 
United States Attorney’s Offices and six divisions of Main 
Justice” have the authority to enter into, and to set the terms 
of, Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements.129 Inconsistency 
between agreements also results from the particular 
requirements and needs of the prosecutor. In many cases, the 
terms of an agreement “could very likely turn on the luck of the 
draw regarding which office happens to handle the 
prosecution.”130  
The SFO may be able to avoid this basic problem of 
inconsistency, as it is the only office thus far in the United 
Kingdom that has entered into Compliance Agreements. This 
ensures that, at the very least, the prosecutor offering the 
agreement may be familiar with and have access to the terms 
of prior agreements. Whether or not the prosecutor chooses to 
follow the terms set forth in prior agreements, however, is 
within the discretion of the individual attorney, and thus 
agreements may still be inconsistent. Further, the SFO, unlike 
United States Attorney’s Offices, uses contract attorneys who 
  
 125 See Spivak & Raman, supra note 80, at 180-81.  
 126 SFO GUIDE, supra note 123, at 3. 
 127 Id. at 3-4. 
 128 See Balfour Press Release, supra note 110; SFO Press Release, supra note 111. 
 129 See Ridge & Baird, supra note 23, at 191. 
 130 Spivak & Raman, supra note 80, at 171-72. See id. at 171-75 for a 
comparison of requirements in Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements issued by 
the SDNY and the District of New Jersey. Further complicating this issue in the 
United States is that prosecutors at the state Attorney General’s offices also have 
authority to prosecute corporations and to enter into their own Deferred and Non-
Prosecution Agreements. 
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conduct all Crown Court and appellate advocacy, including the 
preparatory work.131 Contracting out cases to attorneys 
undermines the accountability of prosecutors and of the SFO as 
a whole, and it jeopardizes the continuity of knowledge and 
decision-making in both specific cases and the SFO’s 
prosecution practices in general.132 
By importing American procedures without improving 
upon them, the SFO is likely to face many of the same 
criticisms as the DOJ. The SFO’s refusal to provide uniform, 
codified guidance on the use and terms of these agreements is 
likely to result in uncertainty and inconsistency in different 
cases. The absence of judicial oversight leaves prosecutors with 
powerful tools that are unchecked and may be abused. The 
SFO’s failure to require public disclosure also creates 
uncertainty among corporate directors in making risk 
assessments ex ante, which heaps substantial costs on 
companies, employees, and shareholders, and could present 
problems for attorneys and consultants who are often hired to 
advise on corporate compliance programs.133  
Despite these likely problems, policymakers at both the 
DOJ and the SFO maintain that by providing only “general” 
guidelines on the terms of the agreements, prosecutors have 
the flexibility to tailor the agreements on a case-by-case basis 
and to experiment, which may over time lead to the emergence 
of best practices.134 However, as shown in the past decade in the 
United States, “best practices” are unlikely to emerge. Instead, 
“best practices” simply become the most “common practices.”135 
  
 131 DE GRAZIA, supra note 11, at 57. In 2006-2007, the SFO spent £4,227,000 
on contract barristers alone. Id. at 3. The Crown Court deals with more serious 
criminal cases, some of which are referred or on appeal from the Magistrates’ Court. Id. 
at 120. Neither the DOJ nor any state prosecutors in the United States contract out 
any part of a prosecution. See id. at 3, 57. 
 132 De Grazia suggested that the SFO cease using contract attorneys for this 
reason. See id. at 6-7. 
 133 Spivak & Raman, supra note 80, at 173. However, the failure to provide 
this guidance could have the opposite effect, making certain attorneys (such as ex-SFO 
staff) more valuable if they have internal, specific expertise about the SFO and its 
prosecutorial decision-making processes that is otherwise difficult to acquire.  
 134 See id. at 173-74. 
 135 See David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 294 (2006). “Best 
practices” with regard to regulations set forth by agencies, for example, often create 
harmonized practices rather than prompt regulators to develop alternatives. Id. at 325. 
And on a global level, “best practices” may simply become a tool of international 
harmonization. Id. at 318-21. 
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And the only consistent trait of Deferred and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements is that they are inconsistent.136 
B. Limitations in Reporting Wrongdoing Despite 
Incentivizing Corporations to Self-Police 
One goal of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements 
is to create incentives for corporations to self-police ex ante and 
thereby establish corporate cultures designed to deter 
employee misconduct. The DOJ achieves this goal by promising 
less punitive sentences if the target entity was found to have 
established an “effective” compliance program before the 
wrongdoing occurred.137 Similarly, the SFO seeks to “bring 
about behavioral change within businesses themselves” by 
incentivizing corporations to establish voluntary compliance 
programs, designed and implemented by management, which 
set forth internal regulations and programs to assist 
compliance officers in self-policing.138 
The SFO creates these incentives by first recommending 
in the Guide that corporations have self-policing programs in 
place before ever coming under investigation.139 The SFO also 
threatens higher sanctions if it discovers unlawful activity 
within the corporation without the assistance of the entity 
itself.140 In such case, “[t]he prospects of a criminal investigation 
followed by prosecution and confiscation order are much 
greater, particularly if the corporat[ion] was aware of the 
problem and had decided not to self report.”141 
One common problem of both Deferred and Non-
Prosecution Agreements and Compliance Agreements is that 
even a corporation’s good faith effort to self-police may still lead 
to a failure of the corporation to report unlawful activity to the 
government. This may occur, for example, because the 
compliance officer failed to find the fraud despite a strong self-
policing program. In this case, both the DOJ and the SFO 
  
 136 Spivak & Raman, supra note 80, at 172-73; see also Finder et al., supra 
note 84, at 11-13 (discussing how Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements have 
changed over time with regard to the needs of the government in each case). 
 137 See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. 
 138 SFO GUIDE, supra note 123, at 2.  
 139 See id. at 1-2. 
 140 Id.  
 141 Id. 
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would hold the failure to self-report as a negative factor against 
the company.142  
The requirement that a corporation self-police and 
report the unlawful activity to the SFO in order to gain 
mitigation points creates unique problems in Britain. If a 
compliance officer detects that low-level employees, rather than 
the “directing mind and will” of the corporation, committed a 
crime, he may be eager to report to the SFO because the 
corporation itself will likely only face civil penalties. Such was 
the case in the Balfour Beatty investigation.143 However, if the 
compliance officer anticipates that the corporation’s high-level 
employees, or the “directing mind and will” of the corporation, 
committed the crime, he may be reluctant to report to the SFO, 
knowing that the corporation would be more likely to face 
criminal charges. Compounding this problem is the fact that 
the SFO has not provided any guidance as to whether a 
corporation could gain mitigation credits for reporting 
wrongdoing if a criminal prosecution resulted from the 
investigation. As a result, the SFO’s policy to give credit to 
corporations that establish corporate compliance programs and 
self-police may only assist the SFO in identifying instances of 
wrongdoing by low-level employees, necessarily resulting only 
in civil penalties.  
C. Uncertainty in the Application of the Compliance 
Agreement Procedure  
In the United States, Deferred and Non-Prosecution 
Agreements can be used in response to any type of criminal 
activity. In Britain, Compliance Agreements have only been 
used in cases of foreign bribery, and then only in conjunction 
with CROs.144 There is also no indication that the SFO would 
consider entering into a Compliance Agreement in a situation 
where the corporation could be held criminally responsible for 
violating a statute that provides a specific offense for 
corporations, such as the Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act and the Bribery Act.145 
  
 142  Id. at 8. 
 143 See supra Part III.B. 
 144 See supra Part III.B. 
 145  See supra Part II.A. In fact, the case of R v. Innospec Ltd., [2010] EW Misc. 
(EWCC) 7 (Eng.), may prohibit the SFO from seeking a civil recovery where criminal 
penalty is possible. See supra notes 39-55 and accompanying text.  
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If the recent history of corporate criminal prosecution in 
the United States is any prediction, it is likely that the SFO 
will increase its efforts to encourage companies to self-police for 
all types of criminal wrongdoing. Congress enacted the FCPA 
in 1977, which provided criminal sanctions for individuals who 
bribed public officials, and encouraged public companies to 
create and maintain records of the way that employees used 
corporate assets.146 As a result of the passage of the FCPA, 
attorneys began advising corporate clients of the need to create 
and maintain “internal processes” designed to deter employees 
from acting in contravention of the statute.147 As a result, most, 
if not all, American corporations have some kind of self-policing 
program in place that now detects a variety of employee 
misconduct.148  
Similarly, after the SFO’s positive response to Balfour 
Beatty’s internal monitoring program that detected foreign 
bribery, British attorneys have begun to advise corporate 
clients of the increased need to establish internal processes 
designed to monitor all types of employee misconduct.149 In 
addition, statutes such as the Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act encourage corporations to self-police 
and report wrongdoing to the government.150 Moreover, 
  
 146 See supra note 106 and accompanying text.  
 147 Miriam Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 949, 962-
963 (2009).  
 148  See supra note 91 and accompanying text.  
 149 Client Alerts about the increased need for corporate compliance programs 
have been published by a number of international firms. See, e.g., The UK’s Serious 
Fraud Office Announces Guide to Self-Reporting of Overseas Corruption by 
Corporations, INT’L REG. BULL. (Bryan Cave LLP), July 23, 2009, available at http:// 
www.bryancave.com/bulletins/list.aspx?Date=2009 (follow “The UK’s Serious Fraud 
Office Announces Guide to Self-Reporting of Overseas Corruption by Corporations” 
hyperlink); The Criminalisation of Corporate Conduct, BRIEFING (Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer LLP), May 2009, available at http://www.freshfields.com/ 
publications/pdfs/2009/may09/25753.pdf; William Jacobson et al., Two Recent Cases 
Show UK Is Active in Enforcement of Foreign Bribery Laws, FULBRIGHT BRIEFING 
(Fulbright & Jaworski LLP), Oct. 13, 2008, available at http://www.fulbright.com/ 
index.cfm?fuseaction=publications.detail&pub_id=3619&site_id=494&detail=yes; Sarah 
E. Steicker & James T. Parkinson, US DOJ and SEC Aggressively Pursuing FCPA Cases; 
SEC Forms Specialized FCPA Enforcement Unit, FCPA WATCH (Mayer Brown LLP), 
Aug. 20, 2009, available at http://www.mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id 
=7442&nid=6; see also Richard Alderman, Dir., Serious Fraud Office, Speech: Recent 
Developments at the Serious Fraud Office (Sept. 10, 2009), available at http://www.sfo. 
gov.uk/about-us/our-views/speeches/speeches-2009.aspx (follow “Recent developments” 
hyperlink) (discussing the SFO’s plan to continue using Compliance Agreements). 
 150 The Corporate Manslaughter and Homicide Act provides that in 
considering the actions of corporations, the jury can evaluate “the extent to which the 
evidence shows that there were attitudes, policies, systems, or accepted practices 
within the organisation that were likely to have encouraged any such failure [of due 
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Alderman has announced that he seeks to expand the use of 
Compliance Agreements151 and may do so by using those 
agreements in response to different kinds of misconduct. 
Consequently, corporations are more likely to establish 
programs designed to deter all kinds of employee wrongdoing, 
and the SFO may increasingly consider these programs when 
evaluating the liability of the corporation and whether to 
pursue prosecution.  
With policymakers in the United Kingdom importing 
procedures designed to effect corporate reform, multinational 
organizations face additional burdens. For example, differing 
substantive laws in various countries subject multinational 
corporations to different standards of liability and varying 
penalties. One pertinent example is the statutes governing 
foreign corruption in each jurisdiction which define bribery 
differently. Federal substantive law allows for facilitation 
payments,152 while British law does not.153 A compliance program 
in a multinational corporation would have to account for these 
differences. Facilitation payments are only one example of 
thousands of variations in the laws that could trigger liability 
in one jurisdiction but not the other. The converse is also true; 
unlawful conduct committed by employees in one office in a 
  
care] . . . or to have produced tolerance of it . . . .” Corporate Manslaughter and 
Homicide Act, 2007 c.19, § 8(3)(a) (U.K.). 
 151 In April 2009, Alderman stated that the SFO was “already identifying 
cases where there is clear evidence to establish that property was obtained through 
unlawful conduct” such that a CRO could be issued. Richard Alderman, Dir., Serious 
Fraud Office, Speech: The Changing Face of Fraud Trials (Apr. 30, 2009), available at 
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-views/speeches/speeches-2009.aspx (follow “The 
Changing Face of Fraud Trials” hyperlink). As recently as July 15, 2010, Alderman 
stated that the SFO “remain[s] very committed to [its] guidance and to the use of civil 
recovery in appropriate cases” and that, in addition to issuing more CROs, “[t]here will 
be more prosecutions to follow.” Richard Alderman, Dir., Serious Fraud Office, Speech: 
Eversheds Round Table Discussion (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/ 
about-us/our-views/speeches/speeches-20010.aspx (follow “Evershed Round Table 
Discussion” hyperlink). 
 152 Facilitation payments assist a corporation in securing the issuance of work 
papers, police protection, mail delivery, electrical or plumbing services, or product 
clearance through customs. In order to qualify for exemption from liability, the 
payments must (1) “relate to a routine government action and be modest in amount,” 
(2) the corporation must be able to show that the payment “affected the timing rather 
than the substance” of the government action, and (3) the corporation must be able to 
show that payment was required in order to protect against the destruction of an 
important commercial interest or risk to employees. Richard Alderman, Dir., Serious 
Fraud Office, Speech: Talking Corruption with the SFO (Oct. 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-views/speeches/speeches-2009.aspx (follow “Talking 
Corruption with the SFO” hyperlink). 
 153 Id. 
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multinational corporation may subject it to further 
investigation and liability in multiple jurisdictions.154  
In addition, the SFO and the DOJ may not look to the 
same factors in evaluating the effectiveness of a compliance 
program. The SFO Guide states that prosecutors will examine 
a variety of enumerated factors,155 while the USAM has no 
formulaic requirements. Further complicating the issue is that 
neither the DOJ nor the SFO will evaluate a corporation’s 
compliance program in advance of an investigation to give an 
opinion as to whether it would be viewed as “effective” in a 
later proceeding.156 This leaves multinational corporations 
operating in both jurisdictions with different sets of vague 
standards by which to model their compliance programs.  
V. SUCCESSES OF COMPLIANCE AGREEMENTS AND 
SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING DEFERRED AND NON-
PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS 
Despite the anticipated shortcomings of the Compliance 
Agreement procedure, the SFO’s ability to achieve many of the 
same goals as American prosecutors by using a civil, rather 
than a criminal procedure may suggest ways to improve the 
American system. At the very least, the British successes 
demonstrate an alternative method of achieving corporate 
reform and restitution after a finding of corporate misconduct.  
  
 154  See supra note 39-55 and accompanying text (discussing R v. Innospec 
Ltd., [2010] EW Misc. (EWCC) 7 (Eng.) in which a subsidiary of Innospec Inc. came 
under investigation in the United Kingdom after the DOJ began investigating the 
parent company for foreign bribery).  
 155 In assessing whether the corporation has instituted an effective compliance 
program, the Guide states that prosecutors at the SFO will examine whether the 
corporation has a code of ethics; a statement of anti-corruption culture that is “fully 
and visibly supported at the highest levels;” individual accountability for wrongdoing; 
training mechanisms; regular checks and auditing in a “proportionate manner” to the 
activity being performed; a corporate helpline which enables employees to report 
concerns; and “appropriate and consistent disciplinary processes.” SFO GUIDE, supra 
note 123, at 7-8. The DOJ states that as long as the corporation’s program is not 
merely a “paper program,” it has no “formulaic requirements” for the program. USAM, 
supra note 88, § 9-28.800(B). In evaluating a corporation’s compliance system, federal 
prosecutors are instructed to evaluate whether the program is “well designed,” “applied 
earnestly and in good faith,” and whether the program “work[s].” Id.  
 156 The SFO does, in some instances, provide advisory opinions in advance of a 
transaction, as other regulatory bodies do in the United States and Britain. The SFO has 
stated that it will provide guidance in a situation where a corporation is proposing to take 
over another corporation, but during its due diligence, discovers evidence of overseas 
corruption, and the corporation seeks to understand what remedial measures the SFO 
would require if the transaction were to occur. SFO GUIDE, supra note 123, at 2. There is 
no indication that the SFO would provide an advisory opinion in any other circumstance. 
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A. Limiting Adversarial Relationships Between 
Corporations and Governments 
Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements require the 
target corporation to cooperate with the government under 
threat of criminal prosecution. Thus, one criticism of these 
agreements is that they are inherently coercive and create 
adversarial relationships between the government and 
corporations operating in the United States.157 In contrast, 
Compliance Agreements do not threaten future sanction for a 
corporation’s failure to cooperate with the government. 
Criminal prosecution can only result if evidence emerges 
during the investigation that the “directing mind and will” of 
the organization was engaged in unlawful conduct.158 In fact, 
the SFO Guide does not describe the course of action that the 
SFO would take if the target corporation failed to meet the 
terms provided in the Compliance Agreement. 
Threat of criminal prosecution for noncompliance with 
the terms in a Deferred or Non-Prosecution Agreement may 
give corporations greater motivation to comply with the 
demands of the government in the United States than in the 
United Kingdom. Some have argued that because the 
consequences of an indictment are so severe, business 
organizations will go to almost any length in order to appease 
the prosecutor.159 This means that the government, in turn, can 
expect the target corporation to be amenable to virtually every 
demand it makes.160 This is especially so because it is the 
  
 157 See Peter J. Henning, The Organizational Guidelines: R.I.P.?, 116 YALE 
L.J. 312 (Pocket Pt. 2007); see also Baer, supra note 147, at 949. 
 158 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 159 Indeed, some have argued that an indictment is a “death-sentence” for a 
corporation, citing the indictment of Arthur Andersen for its role in the Enron scandal. 
See, e.g., Spivak & Raman, supra note 80, at 165-66. When the government approached 
Arthur Andersen with a Deferred Prosecution Agreement, it “refused initially to accept 
responsibility for its misconduct and would not agree to major structural reforms.” Id. 
at 165. Negotiations finally “collapsed, principally because the company viewed 
prosecutors’ demands for cooperation as too onerous.” Id. The company was then 
indicted and convicted, which “effectively put the eighty-nine-year old firm out of 
business and forced tens of thousands of people to find new jobs.” Id. at 166 (quoting 
Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in a Post-Enron 
World, 43 CRIM. L. REV. 1095, 1097 (2006)). 
 160 Griffin, supra note 80, at 327. A DOJ official commented, “There’s a right 
way and a wrong way to respond when the government comes knocking at your door,” 
when comparing Arthur Andersen’s indictment to Merrill Lynch’s settlement 
agreement. Id. (quoting John R. Emshwiller & Ann Davis, Merrill Takes Enron 
Responsibility, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2003, at A3).  
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prosecutor who ultimately decides whether the entity has 
sufficiently met all the terms of the agreement.161 
Under this view, British Compliance Agreements, 
because they do not threaten criminal indictment, give target 
corporations less motivation to cooperate with the government. 
However, cases like Balfour Beatty162 and AMEC plc,163 suggest 
that regardless of whether or not the threat of criminal 
indictment exists, corporations seek to comply with the 
government’s demands. Thus, the cooperation of a target entity 
need not be predicated upon the threat of future criminal 
prosecution. Instead, civil sanctions combined with Compliance 
Agreements may achieve the same goals as Deferred and Non-
Prosecution Agreements, while diminishing the adversarial 
and coercive relationship between the government and 
corporations. British Compliance Agreements have the added 
benefit of giving a target entity greater ability to advocate for 
terms of an agreement in its favor and to negotiate with the 
government to find mutually acceptable remedial measures, 
thereby achieving one of the goals of both the DOJ and SFO—
to create agreements that are flexible and individually tailored 
for each corporation.164  
  
 161 See Griffin, supra note 80 at 320-21. However, some argue that the threat 
of criminal prosecution may not be as severe as some once believed. For example, a jury 
recently acquitted W.R. Grace, and three of its executives, which had been indicted for 
violating the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2006), by releasing asbestos-
contaminated vermiculite. Bob Van Voris et al., W.R. Grace Acquittal Clears Way for 
End to 8-Year Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG (May 9, 2009, 12:01 AM) http://www. 
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a6WFdRnfLuNE.  
 162 See supra Part III.B.  
 163 In March 2008, AMEC reported to the SFO a finding of irregular payments 
which were made when the company was associated in a project in which it was a 
shareholder. Press Release, Serious Fraud Office, SFO Obtains Civil Recovery Order 
against AMEC plc. (Oct. 26, 2009) [hereinafter AMEC Press Release], available at 
http://www.sfo.gov.uk/press-room/latest-press-releases/press-releases-2009/sfo-obtains-
civil-recovery-order-against-amec-plc.aspx. The SFO determined that the unlawful 
conduct amounted to a failure to comply with section 221 of the Companies Act, 1985, 
c.40 (U.K). Id. AMEC agreed to pay £4,943,648 in restitution and pledged to improve 
their compliance procedure and appoint a monitor to report back to the SFO. Id.  
 164 Too little adversarialism comes with its own problems, however. Without 
some adversarial posture, prosecutors and regulators can become too lenient and can lose 
the “healthy dose of skepticism necessary to monitor and discipline” corporate actors. 
Baer, supra note 147, at 981 (citing William Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and 
Accounting: Rules Versus Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1032 (2003)). 
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B. The Ability of the SFO to Pursue Individual Corporate 
Wrongdoers  
Another goal of the federal government in entering into 
Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements is the increased 
ability to pursue individual wrongdoers by obtaining additional 
information from the target entity.165 However, Deferred and 
Non-Prosecution Agreements have come under attack in recent 
years for including terms that require corporations to hand 
over privileged documents and that force employees to speak 
with prosecutors. In fact, because of United States v. Stein and 
internal DOJ responses to perceived prosecutorial 
overreaching, prosecutors are now limited in what they may 
demand from corporations during negotiations.166 The DOJ may 
no longer compel a corporation to cease payment of promised 
attorneys’ fees to employees, and eligibility for cooperation 
credit can no longer be given solely based upon the 
corporation’s waiver of attorney-client privilege protection.167 
The DOJ may not request the disclosure of certain 
communications between employees and their attorneys or 
corporate counsel, including communications with attorneys 
that occurred prior to or at the time of the underlying 
conduct,168 and it cannot request any “non-factual or core 
attorney work product.”169 The limit in what prosecutors may 
now demand from a target corporation illustrates how coercive 
the investigations and negotiations can become.  
The British procedure demonstrates that prosecutors 
may be able to pursue individual wrongdoers without the 
threat of criminal indictment. The SFO Guide provides that, in 
deciding whether or not to enter into a Compliance Agreement, 
prosecutors will evaluate whether the corporation “is prepared 
  
 165 Griffin, supra note 80, at 329-32.  
 166 See note 82 and accompanying text. However, the limitations on the DOJ 
provided in the McNulty Memorandum as a result of United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 
2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), could be reduced or modified by subsequent memoranda as the 
guidelines are not statutorily codified. See supra notes 121-22 and accompanying text. 
 167 USAM, supra note 88, § 9-28.720 to 9-28.730.  
 168 This is limited to situations only with regard to communications between 
attorneys and individuals where the defendant has a “legitimate factual basis to support 
the assertion of the advice-of-counsel defense.” USAM, supra note 88, § 9-28.720. 
 169 “Non-factual or core-attorney work product” is defined, by way of example, 
as an attorney’s “mental impressions or legal theories.” Id. The government may still 
compel the disclosure of records and witness testimony through subpoenas as it would 
in any other criminal investigation, thereby giving prosecutors the ability to obtain 
information from the corporation and individuals alike. Id. 
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to work with [the SFO] on the scope and handling of any 
additional investigation [that the SFO] consider[s] to be 
necessary,” including taking “appropriate action . . . against 
individuals.”170 In the investigation of AMEC for receipt of 
irregular payments and failure to comply with reporting 
standards in section 221 of the Companies Act,171 the SFO 
entered into a Compliance Agreement and obtained a CRO that 
required the corporation to make a financial forfeiture, but the 
SFO continued to investigate the individuals at AMEC because 
of their positions in the company.172 The AMEC case was settled 
with respect to the corporation, which provided information 
about individual actors during the investigation, but a criminal 
investigation continued against individual employees.173 The 
SFO requested the relevant facts regarding the employee 
misconduct in order for the corporation to meet the terms of the 
Compliance Agreement and gain mitigation points. However, 
there is no evidence that the SFO required the corporation to 
turn over privileged documents, or that employees were forced 
to speak with the government in order for the corporation to 
meet the terms of the agreement. The AMEC investigation 
demonstrates that the threat of criminal prosecution may not 
be necessary in order for the government to pursue its goals, 
including the goal of securing information about individual 
actors. And in fact, the SFO may have more flexibility in 
requesting certain documents and interviews because the 
investigation into the corporation’s activities is civil, rather 
than criminal in nature.  
C. The Benefits of “Light Touch” Monitoring  
Another goal of the government in entering into 
Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements is the ability to 
  
 170 SFO GUIDE, supra note 123, at 3-4. In determining possible criminal 
charges against individuals, the SFO will examine to what extent they were involved in 
the unlawful activity, what action the entity has taken with respect to them, and 
whether the individuals benefitted, and were continuing to benefit financially from the 
unlawful conduct. Id. 
 171 Companies Act, 1989, c.40, § 221(1) (governing accounting records).  
 172 Richard Alderman, Dir., Serious Fraud Office, Speech: The 4th ICAC 
Symposium (Dec. 15, 2009), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-views/ 
speeches/speeches-2009.aspx (follow “The 4th ICAC Symposium” hyperlink); see also 
AMEC Press Release, supra note 163. 
 173 Alderman, supra note 172. This is dissimilar from the case of Balfour Beatty, 
where the SFO concluded that the responsible individuals were no longer employed by 
the company and ceased further investigation. See Alderman, supra note 12. 
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require corporate wrongdoers to retain a monitor whose 
“primary responsibility should be to assess and [to] review a 
corporation’s compliance with those terms of the agreement 
that are specifically designed to address and [to] reduce the 
risk of recurrence of the corporation’s misconduct.”174  
In the United States, the imposition of a monitor of the 
government’s choosing has been a source of significant criticism 
of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements. The first 
denunciation of monitors came after United States Attorney 
and subsequent governor of New Jersey, Christopher J. 
Christie, awarded his former boss, Attorney General John 
Ashcroft and his consulting firm, the Ashcroft Group, a multi-
million dollar contract to monitor Zimmer Holdings, a medical-
supply company that had come under investigation for paying 
kickbacks to doctors.175 As a result, the DOJ distributed the 
Morford Memorandum in March 2008, which set forth 
guidelines for prosecutors in requiring corporations to hire a 
monitor.176 The Morford Memorandum suggests that now, 
where a prosecutor requires a target corporation to hire a 
monitor, the corporation must be allowed to select the 
individual, subject to veto by the prosecutor, or, where a 
prosecutor feels that he must play a “greater role” in the 
  
 174 Memorandum from Craig S. Morford, Acting Deputy Att’y Gen., on 
Selection and Use of Monitors in Deferred Prosecution Agreements and Non-
Prosecution Agreements with Corporations to Heads of Dep’t Components & U.S. 
Attorneys 5 (Mar. 7, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/dag/morford-useof 
monitorsmemo-03072008.pdf. Despite the insistence by federal prosecutors that target 
corporations hire a monitor, some argue that monitors have not been successful in 
reducing corporate misconduct nor have they helped shareholders by improving 
corporate performance. See Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Therapeutics at the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, 73 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 793, 833-34 (2008) (stating that 
the most recent studies find “no significant correlation” between monitors and the 
reduction in corporation misconduct (citations omitted)). An extreme example of the 
failure of monitors to reduce corporate misconduct came in the case of Bristol-Myers 
Squibb. The company was charged by the SEC in 2004 with various accounting frauds 
and agreed to appoint a monitor who was given the responsibility of reviewing the 
accounting practices of the corporation. Press Release, SEC, Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Company Agrees to Pay $150 Million to Settle Fraud Charges (Aug. 4, 2004), available 
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-105.htm; see also Barnard, supra, at 835. Three 
years later, despite the fact that the appointed monitor was “a former United States 
Attorney and a retired federal judge,” the company was charged with “inflating its drug 
prices on bills to for insurers and government agencies” and, later, for entering into “a 
secret non-compete agreement [with a competitor].” Barnard, supra, at 835-36 (citing 
Sue Reisinger, Doctor’s Orders, CORP. COUNSEL (Oct. 1, 2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/ 
cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=900005491068).  
 175 Philip Shenon, Ashcroft Deal Brings Scrutiny in Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 10, 2008, at A1. 
 176 Morford Memorandum, supra note 174. 
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selection of a monitor, he should consider at least three 
qualified candidates.177  
The SFO noted the intense criticism of monitors in the 
United States and instituted a policy of “light touch” 
monitoring, whereby a target corporation may nominate a 
monitor, subject to veto by the SFO.178 With the use of British 
Compliance Agreements, both the method for choosing the 
monitor and the responsibilities of the monitor exist 
independent from the threat of criminal prosecution. Thus, the 
corporation may have a greater ability to negotiate the length 
of time that a monitor is required, the person who fills this 
seat, and the breadth and scope of the monitor’s review.  
D. Predictability in Required Restitution  
The final major goal of the government in entering into 
a Deferred or Non-Prosecution Agreement is to secure an 
agreement that the target corporation will pay restitution, 
often in excess of the actual value of the corporation’s 
wrongdoing. Financial restitution under Deferred and Non-
Prosecution Agreements is designed in part to serve the 
criminal law goals of general and specific deterrence and 
retributivisim; however, the penalties that are now imposed on 
corporations by prosecutors are “more a matter of bargaining 
before charges are ever filed, and less an analysis of the proper 
punishment” of a target corporation’s misconduct.179 This 
punishment falls upon innocent shareholders, creditors, and 
clients, who ultimately pay the fines. 
British Compliance Agreements, however, do not 
themselves support payment of a fine by the target corporation. 
Rather, the government must obtain a CRO in order to collect 
financial restitution.180 These orders are statutorily capped at 
the amount equal to the proceeds that the corporation obtained 
through unlawful activity plus costs.181 The CRO is also subject 
to judicial oversight.182 The statutory cap and the role that 
judges play in reviewing the fines sought by the government 
  
 177 Id. at 3-4. 
 178 SFO GUIDE, supra note 123, at 6. 
 179 Henning, supra note 157, at 315. 
 180 See supra Part III.B. 
 181 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. 
 182 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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provide the target entity with some predictability and relative 
fairness in the fines levied upon it for its wrongdoing.  
In adopting Compliance Agreements that work in 
conjunction with civil statutes, the SFO has made some 
improvements to the American procedure. The successes of 
both the Balfour Beatty and AMEC cases demonstrate that the 
threat of criminal indictment may be unnecessary in many 
cases to achieve corporate reform and appropriate sanctions. 
The SFO has, with the establishment of Compliance 
Agreements, attempted to work within the confines of the 
substantive laws to strike a compromise between the coercive 
nature of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements and the 
inadequacy of government regulation that previously existed in 
Britain. Further, the substantive corporate criminal laws in 
Britain as they presently exist, strike a balance between the 
overly expansive application of corporate criminal liability in 
the United States and the elimination of corporate criminal 
liability altogether. 
CONCLUSION 
A comparison of the corporate criminal laws and 
procedures in the United States and United Kingdom leads to a 
larger question of whether a corporation, as an entity, should 
be subject to criminal prosecution for the actions of its 
employees. Punishing corporations often does not discipline the 
entity as a whole, which acts only through individual 
employees, but rather harms the people associated with the 
corporation whose guilt remains unproven. The substantive 
criminal laws in Britain, as they stand, may attain a balance 
between the vast potential liability for the entity in the United 
States for virtually any misdeed of an employee and the 
elimination of corporate liability altogether. British law reflects 
the notion that corporations should not be held criminally 
liable unless the entity, at its highest level of management, 
was responsible for the wrongdoing. This stringent standard 
leaves culpability in place for corporations that are, at their 
core, mismanaged and severely corrupt,183 while removing the 
threat of criminal prosecution for corporations that are 
  
 183 A recent example might be American International Group (AIG) and the 
dishonest financial practices initiated under Hank Greenberg, AIG’s CEO, particularly 
in reference to the extremely risky trading in derivatives by its financial products unit 
that subsequently caused its collapse. 
2010] IMPORTATION OF CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 341 
managed responsibly, but mistakenly employ errant 
employees. While British Compliance Agreements may fall 
victim to many of the same criticisms as American Deferred 
and Non-Prosecution Agreements, they achieve many of the 
same goals of prosecutors in the United States without 
producing coercive and adversarial relationships between the 
government and target corporations.  
With the British importation of American corporate 
compliance procedures, the world’s two leading financial 
centers are aligning their interests to fight corporate crime. 
These developments create a stronger, more intrusive 
international corporate compliance regime by incentivizing 
corporations, directly or indirectly, to adopt programs designed 
to ward off internal misconduct. The result is that most, if not 
all, public corporations, regardless of a threat of future 
indictment, will establish some internal monitoring processes, 
if they have not yet done so. This creates an unprecedented 
international system of corporate compliance quasi-regulation. 
But, by largely mimicking the procedures of the United States, 
the SFO is abandoning an opportunity to develop a better 
system than the one that presently exists. This may lead to an 
international system of corporate compliance based upon 
common, rather than best practices. Policymakers in both the 
United States and the United Kingdom should examine these 
developments and reevaluate their own procedures accordingly. 
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